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Abstract
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes mechanisms for Parties to “pursue voluntary cooperation in the 
implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation 
and adaptation actions […]” (Article 6.1). I. e. the mechanisms are explicitly designed to foster higher ambition. 
However, without additional guidance and rules, the economic incentives of carbon markets may work against 
increasing host country ambition. For example, setting ambitious NDC targets may directly reduce the amount 
of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target and that a host country can transfer abroad. The report 
presents four options on how the risks can be ad-dressed and ambition can be increased: (1) Strengthening 
reporting, transparency and comparability; (2) Reconciling the design of the Article 6.4 mechanism with 
ambition raising of host countries; (3) Supporting the host country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 
mechanism; (4) Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism. These 
options are assessed and recommendations are provided on how they could be implemented.
Kurzbeschreibung
Artikel 6 des Pariser Abkommens schafft Mechanismen, welche es den Vertragsparteien erlaubt, dass sie sich 
für „eine freiwillige Zusammenarbeit bei der Umsetzung ihrer national festgelegten Beiträge entscheiden, um 
sich für ihre Minderungs- und Anpassungsmaßnahmen höhere Ambitionen setzen zu können […]“ (Artikel 6.1, 
Übersetzung der AutorInnen). D. h. die Mechanismen sind explizit darauf aus-gerichtet, höhere Ambitionen zu 
fördern. Ohne zusätzliche Leitlinien und Regeln können die wirtschaft-lichen Anreize der Kohlenstoffmärkte 
jedoch verhindern, dass die Ambitionen des Gastlandes erhöht werden. So kann beispielsweise die Festlegung 
ehrgeiziger NDC-Ziele die Menge der Emissionsminde-rungen, die über das NDC-Ziel hinausgehen und die ein 
Gastland ins Ausland transferieren kann, direkt reduzieren. Der Bericht stellt vier Optionen vor, wie die Risiken 
angegangen und die Ambitionen gestei-gert werden können: (1) Stärkung der Berichterstattung, Transparenz 
und Vergleichbarkeit; (2) Ausge-staltung des Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus, damit dieser die Ambitionen der Gast-
länder helfen kann zu stei-gern; (3) Unterstützung des Gastgeberlandes, damit dieses die Ambitionen durch den 
Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus steigern kann; (4) Förderung des Beschaffungslandes, damit dieses die Ambitionen 
durch den Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus steigert. Diese Optionen werden bewertet und es werden Empfehlungen 
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Summary
Introduction
The collective ambition level of Parties’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) pledges falls short of 
meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well 
below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels” (Article 2) and “to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions 
by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century” (Article 4). Therefore, 
it is particularly important that the Paris Agreement has an inbuilt mechanism of progressively raising ambition 
levels individually and collectively. 
Ambition raising through Article 6.4
Ambition raising is also a component of the cooperation approaches established under Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement (see Article 6.1), and therefore also a guiding principle for the design and operation of the Article 
6.4 mechanism. This is a departure from the market-based instruments of the Kyoto Protocol, which were meant 
to assist countries in reaching fixed targets through reduced costs, but without any direct relation to their 
commitment levels. Ambition raising can be defined as a process in which Parties enhance their NDC targets 
and/or intensify their mitigation actions.
The incentives set by the Article 6.4 mechanism may not necessarily support or may even conflict with the Paris 
Agreement’s need for ambition raising, depending on the outcome of the ongoing negotiation of the detailed 
modalities and rules. The following examples are key issues discussed in the negotiations: On the one hand, 
setting ambitious targets may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target 
and that a host country can transfer (and sell) abroad. On the other hand, if the Article 6.4. mechanism allows 
for crediting of activities that are beyond the scope of the NDC without requiring the host country to account  
for exported mitigation outcomes from such activities, there is no incentive to expand the scope of the NDC, 
because this would reduce the host country’s potential to obtain external funding.
The paper presents four options on how the risks outlined above could be addressed allowing Article 6.4  
to contribute to ambition raising:
Option 1: Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability
This weakest option to foster ambition raising builds on the comprehensive requirements of the Paris Agree-
ment for transparency, reporting and review and the related guidebook. Parties may choose for a comprehensive 
and strong implementation in order to foster comparability between efforts and therefore ambition raising.
Upfront information: Each party is required to provide upfront information through their NDCs, including  
on the use of Article 6 mechanism, which may make targets and ambition levels comparable between  
different countries and over time. 
Transparency framework and review: The transparency framework for action and support is the main  
mechanism to hold states accountable for the implementation of their NDCs. The rulebook is not very  
specific on reporting about Article 6.4 use, so further guidance is important. 
Global stocktake: The global stocktake on the implementation of the Paris Agreement assesses the collective 
progress and is a key element of the ratcheting mechanism to increase ambition over time. While not specified 
in the rulebook, the stocktake could provide lessons learned and best practices from Parties that have used 
Article 6.4 mechanism to increase ambition. 
Compliance mechanism: The Paris Agreement establishes a mechanism “to facilitate implementation”  
and “promote compliance” (Article 15). The rulebook contains its modalities and procedures, but it remains  
to be seen to what extent it may have an impact on Article 6 and ambition raising.
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Option 2: Reconciling the design of the Article 6.4 mechanism with ambition 
raising of host countries
This option focuses on ways to design the rules, modalities and procedures that operationalize the Article 6.4 
mechanism in such a way that allows countries to raise their ambition without being negatively affected in their 
role as host countries. 
▸	 Requiring host countries to also account through corresponding adjustments for exported mitigation 
outcomes that were generated outside the scope of their NDC
▸	 Restricting crediting periods and adjusting baselines in alignment with the 5-year NDC cycle
▸	 Requiring ambitious crediting baselines
▸	 Defining eligibility criteria for the Article 6.4 mechanism (relating to NDC targets): Coverage of NDC targets, 
engaging in long-term strategies, restricting eligibility of technologies or types of action, requiring ambitious 
and quantified NDC targets
▸	 Requiring inclusion of emissions targeted by Article 6.4 activity into future NDC
▸	 Assuring quality of the mitigation outcomes
Option 3: Supporting the host country to raise ambition through  
the Article 6.4 mechanism
Parties, bi- and multilateral institutions and initiatives can support host countries in fulfilling the requirements 
outlined in the previous section.
Support ambitious target-setting and long-term planning activities: Limited and incomplete planning processes 
can be a reason for unambitious and unclear NDCs as well as incomplete long-term strategies. Therefore, 
support for countries that need it could help increasing ambition.
Facilitate investments in new low-carbon technologies: The Article 6.4 mechanism should facilitate investments 
in technologies in a host country that would be unable to make such investments unilaterally. There could  
be positive lists for (high cost) emerging technologies and negative lists for low-cost, mature technologies.
Option 4: Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through  
the Article 6.4 mechanism
An acquiring country can use the mitigation outcomes purchased to reach their NDC target, but also to cancel  
(a part of) the mitigation outcomes to increase its ambition.
Using lower compliance costs for ambition raising: The country is lowering its cost of compliance with its NDC 
target if the implementation of policies that would be necessary to reach the NDC has higher marginal abate-
ment costs than the purchase of the mitigation outcomes from the Article 6.4 mechanism. If the acquiring 
country invests the savings in domestic reductions or international climate finance, this can lead to increased 
ambition.
Increasing ambition with long-term strategies: Embedding the purchase of mitigation outcomes in long-term 
strategies and clear communication of these strategies can help increasing ambition.
Increasing ambition through risk reduction: The country bears a risk of not being able to attain its NDC target 
due to financial or technical constraints. Mitigation outcomes are acquired to hedge the risk.
“Insetting” or linking use of mitigation outcomes to domestic mitigation activities: Countries wishing to  
use mitigation outcomes from abroad to achieve their NDC could voluntarily commit to carry out additional 
domestic reductions.
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Recommendations
The first two options may be implemented on different levels, depending on the level of international agreement 
with regard to the need to prevent perverse incentives from the use of the Article 6.4 mechanism. The following 
cascade may be considered:
▸	 CMA/ rulebook level (international governance setting required)
▸	 Supervisory Body for Article 6.4
▸	 “Club” of likeminded parties
▸	 Individual acquiring countries defining criteria for mitigation outcomes purchase
The third option is the support of host countries to raise ambition. This is a role that many (potential) acquiring 
countries and multilateral institutions have historically carried out already in the Kyoto periods and will 
probably continue to do so under the Paris Agreement.
The fourth option is fostering action to raise ambition on the side of the acquiring country. This is key to  
achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement and will mainly be achieved individually.
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Zusammenfassung
Einleitung
Die kollektive Ambition der Vertragsparteien in ihren national festgelegten Beiträgen (NDCs) entspricht nicht 
den Zielen des Paris Abkommens, „den Anstieg der globalen Durchschnittstemperatur auf deutlich unter 2 °C 
über dem vorindustriellen Niveau“ (Artikel 2, Übersetzung durch AutorInnen) zu halten und „ein Gleichgewicht 
zwischen den anthropogenen Emissionen von Treibhausgasen aus Quellen und dem Abbau solcher Gase mittels 
Senken in der zweiten Hälfte dieses Jahrhunderts zu erreichen“ (Artikel 4, Übersetzung durch AutorInnen). 
Daher ist es besonders wichtig, dass das Paris Abkommen über einen eingebauten Mechanismus verfügt,  
der es ermöglicht, die Ambitionen sowohl einzeln als auch gemeinsam stetig anzuheben. 
Ambitionsförderung durch Artikel 6.4
Die Ambitionsförderung ist auch Bestandteil der in Artikel 6 des Paris Abkommens festgelegten Kooperations-
ansätze (siehe Artikel 6.1) und damit auch ein Leitprinzip für die Gestaltung und Durchführung des Artikel 
6.4Mechanismus. Dies ist eine Abkehr von den marktbasierten Instrumenten des Kyoto Protokolls, welche den 
Ländern helfen sollten, festgelegte Ziele durch Kostensenkungen zu erreichen, jedoch ohne direkten Bezug zur 
Höhe ihrer Verpflichtungen. Ambitionsförderung kann definiert werden als ein Prozess, in dem die Vertrags-
parteien ihre NDC-Ziele verbessern und/oder ihre Minderungsmaßnahmen intensivieren.
Die durch den Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus gesetzten Anreize unterstützen die Notwendigkeit der Erhöhung  
der Ambitionen des Pariser Abkommens nicht automatisch oder können sie sogar behindern, je nach Ergebnis 
der laufenden Verhandlungen über die detaillierten Modalitäten und Regeln. Die folgenden Beispiele sind 
Schlüssel elemente, die in den Verhandlungen diskutiert werden: Einerseits kann die Festlegung ehrgeiziger 
NDC-Ziele die Menge der Emissionsminderungen, die über das NDC-Ziel hinausgehen und die ein Gastland  
ins Ausland transferieren (und verkaufen) kann, direkt reduzieren. Oder wenn der Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus  
die Anrechnung von Aktivitäten erlaubt, die über den Anwendungsbereich des NDC hinausgehen, ohne dass 
das Gastland verpflichtet ist, die exportierten Minderungserträge aus solchen Aktivitäten zu berücksichtigen, 
besteht kein Anreiz, den Anwendungsbereich des NDC auszuweiten, da dies das Potenzial des Gastlandes, 
externe Finanzmittel zu erhalten, verringern würde.
Das Papier stellt vier Optionen vor, wie die oben skizzierten Risiken angegangen werden könnten,  
so dass Artikel 6.4 zur Steigerung der Ambitionen beitragen kann:
Option 1: Stärkung der Berichterstattung, Transparenz und Vergleichbarkeit
Diese schwächste Option zur Steigerung der Ambitionen baut auf den umfassenden Anforderungen des Paris 
Abkommens und des entsprechenden Leitfadens (rulebook) an Transparenz, Berichterstattung und Überprü-
fung auf. Die Vertragsparteien können sich für eine umfassende und starke Umsetzung entscheiden, um die 
Vergleichbarkeit zwischen den Bemühungen und die Ambitionssteigerung zu fördern.
Vorabinformationen: Jede Vertragspartei ist verpflichtet, über ihre NDCs Vorabinformationen zur Verfügung  
zu stellen, auch über die Anwendung des Mechanismus in Artikel 6. Dies kann die Ziele und Ambitionen 
zwischen den verschiedenen Ländern und über die Zeit hinweg vergleichbar machen. 
Transparenzrahmen und Überprüfung: Der Transparenzrahmen für Maßnahmen und Unterstützung ist der 
Hauptmechanismus, um die Staaten für die Umsetzung ihrer NDCs zur Verantwortung zu ziehen. Der Leitfaden 
(rulebook) ist nicht sehr spezifisch bezüglich der Berichterstattung über die Verwendung von Artikel 6.4, 
weshalb weitere Anleitungen wichtig sind. 
Bestandsaufnahme: Die globale Bestandsaufnahme zur Umsetzung des Pariser Abkommens bewertet den 
kollektiven Fortschritt und ist ein Schlüsselelement des Ratcheting-Mechanismus zur Steigerung der Ambitio-
 nen im Laufe der Zeit. Auch wenn im Leitfaden (rulebook) nicht festgelegt, so könnte die Bestandsaufnahme 
Erkenntnisse und bewährte Praktiken von Vertragsparteien liefern, die den Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus genutzt 
haben, um ihre Ambitionen zu erhöhen. 
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Compliance-Mechanismus: Mit dem Paris Abkommen wird ein Mechanismus eingeführt, der „die Umsetzung 
erleichtert“ und „die Einhaltung der Bestimmungen des Abkommens fördert“ (Artikel 15, Übersetzung durch 
AutorInnen). Der Leitfaden (rulebook) enthält die Modalitäten und Verfahren, aber es bleibt abzuwarten, 
inwieweit diese Auswirkungen auf Artikel 6 und die Steigerung der Ambitionen haben kann.
Option 2: Ausgestaltung des Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus, damit dieser die 
Ambitionen der Gastländer helfen kann zu steigern
Diese Option konzentriert sich auf Möglichkeiten, die Regeln, Modalitäten und Verfahren zur Umsetzung  
des Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus so zu gestalten, dass die Länder ihre Ambitionen steigern können, ohne in  
ihrer Rolle als Gastländer negativ beeinflusst zu werden. 
▸	 Verpflichtung der Gastländer, auch für exportierte Minderungserträge, die außerhalb ihres NDC erzielt 
wurden, durch entsprechende Anpassungen Rechnung zu tragen.
▸	 Einschränkung der Anrechnungszeiträume und Anpassung der Baselines an den 5-jährigen NDC-Zyklus.
▸	 Erfordern anspruchsvoller Baselines.
▸	 Festlegung von Zulassungskriterien für den Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus (in Bezug auf die NDC-Ziele):  
Reichweite der NDC-Ziele, Formulierung langfristiger Strategien, Einschränkung der Zulässigkeit von 
Technologien oder Arten von Maßnahmen, Forderung nach ehrgeizigen und quantifizierten NDC-Zielen.
▸	 Integration der in Artikel 6.4 genannten Emissionen in die künftigen NDCs.
▸	 Sicherstellung der Qualität der Minderungserträge.
Option 3: Unterstützung des Gastgeberlandes, damit dieses die Ambitionen 
durch den Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus steigern kann
Vertragsparteien sowie bi- und multilaterale Institutionen und Initiativen können die Gastländer bei der 
Erfüllung der im vorherigen Abschnitt beschriebenen Anforderungen unterstützen.
Unterstützung ambitionierter Zielvereinbarungen und langfristiger Planungsaktivitäten: Begrenzte und unvoll-
ständige Planungsprozesse können ein Grund für wenig ambitionierte und unklare NDCs sowie unvollständige 
langfristige Strategien sein. Daher könnte die Unterstützung von Ländern, die diese benötigen, dazu beitragen, 
die Ambitionen zu erhöhen.
Erleichterung von Investitionen in neue kohlenstoffarme Technologien: Der Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus sollte 
Investitionen in Technologien in einem Gastland erleichtern, das nicht in der Lage wäre, solche Investitionen 
alleine durchzuführen. Es könnte positive Listen für (teure) neue Technologien und negative Listen für kosten-
günstige, ausgereifte Technologien geben.
Option 4: Förderung des Beschaffungslandes, damit dieses die Ambitionen 
durch den Artikel 6.4 Mechanismus erhöhen
Ein Beschaffungsland kann die erzielten Minderungserträge nutzen, um sein NDC-Ziel zu erreichen, aber auch, 
um (einen Teil der) Minderungserträge zu annullieren und seine Ambitionen zu erhöhen.
Nutzung niedrigerer Compliance-Kosten zur Steigerung der Ambitionen: Das Land senkt seine Kosten für die 
Einhaltung seines NDC-Ziels, wenn die Umsetzung von Massnahmen, die notwendig wären zu Erreichung des 
NDC-Ziels, höhere marginale Minderungskosten verursacht als der Kauf der Minderungserträge als Teil des 
Artikel 6.4-Mechanismus . Wenn das Beschaffungsland die Ersparnisse in inländische Reduktionen oder 
internationale Klimafinanzierungen investiert, kann dies zu einer erhöhten Ambition führen.
Ambitionssteigerung durch langfristige Strategien: Die Einbettung des Erwerbs von Minderungserträge in 
langfristige Strategien und die klare Kommunikation dieser Strategien kann bei der Steigerung der Ambitionen 
helfen.
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Steigerung der Ambitionen durch Risikominderung: Ein Land trägt das Risiko, dass es aufgrund finanzieller 
oder technischer Herausforderungen sein NDC-Ziel nicht erreichen kann. Zur Absicherung des Risikos werden 
Minderungserträge erworben.
„Insetting“ oder die Verknüpfung der Nutzung von Minderungserträgen mit nationalen Minderungsmaß-
nahmen: Länder, die die Erträge der Minderung aus dem Ausland zur Erreichung ihrer NDC-Ziele nutzen 
wollen, könnten sich freiwillig verpflichten, zusätzliche inländische Reduktionen durchzuführen.
Empfehlungen
Die ersten zwei Optionen können auf verschiedenen Ebenen umgesetzt werden, je nach Verhandlungsergebnis 
und Einigung bezüglich der Notwendigkeit, perverse Anreize durch die Anwendung des Artikel 6.4 Mechanis-
 mus zu verhindern. Die folgende Kaskade kann berücksichtigt werden:
▸	 CMA/ Leitfaden (rulebook) (internationale Gouvernanz-Strukturen erforderlich)
▸	 Artikel 6.4 Aufsichtsgremium
▸	 „Club“ von gleichgesinnten Vertragsparteien
▸	 Beschaffungsländer definieren individuell die Kriterien für den Kauf von Minderungserträgen
Die dritte Option ist die Unterstützung der Gastländer bei der Erreichung ihrer Ziele. Dies ist eine Rolle, die viele 
(potenzielle) Beschaffungsländer und multilaterale Institutionen bereits in der Vergangenheit, in den Kyoto- 
Perioden ausgeübt haben und wahrscheinlich auch im Rahmen des Paris Abkommens weiter ausüben werden.
Die vierte Option besteht darin, das Beschaffungsland in der Erhöhung seiner Ambitionen zu fördern. Dies wird 
in erster Linie von den einzelnen Vertragsparteien individuell verfolgt, um so zur Erreichung der Ziele des Paris 
Abkommens beitragen zu können.
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1 Introduction
The collective ambition level of Parties’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) pledges falls short  
of meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement “to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions  
by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century” (Article 4) and to  
limit global temperature increase to “well below” 2°C. The UN Gap Report (2017, p. xiv) concludes that  
“the NDCs that form the foundation of the Paris Agreement cover only approximately one third of the emissions 
reductions needed to be on a least cost pathway for the goal of staying well below 2°C” and identifies an  
“urgent need for accelerated short-term action and enhanced longer-term national ambition”. The IPCC Special 
Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C reaffirmed these observations, stating that current NDCs  
are broadly consistent with pathways that result in a global warming of about 3 °C by 2100, with warming 
continuing afterwards (IPCC 2018). 
Given this weakness of the current NDC targets, it is particularly important that the Paris Agreement includes  
an inbuilt mechanism of progressively raising ambition levels individually and collectively. Several provisions 
of the Paris Agreement are intended to contribute to ambition raising. However, while this makes ambition 
raising a key concept of the Paris Agreement, a clear definition is still missing. We will therefore first explore 
this concept by building on the key provisions contained in the Paris Agreement. Ambition raising is also  
a component of the cooperation approaches established under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, and therefore 
also a guiding principle for the design and operation of the Article 6.4 mechanism, which will be the focus  
of this section. 
Having ambition raising as an explicit goal of international cooperation is new and a departure from the 
market-based instruments of the Kyoto Protocol, which were meant to assist countries in reaching fixed targets 
through reduced costs, but without any direct relation to their commitment levels (Warnecke et al. 2018). 
Depending on the outcome of the ongoing negotiation of the detailed modalities and rules for Article 6.4  
(as of March 2019), the incentives set by the Article 6.4 mechanism may not necessarily support or may even 
conflict with the Paris Agreement’s need for ambition raising and regular “ratcheting-up” of Parties ambition 
levels. 
The following examples are key issues discussed in the negotiations: On the one hand, setting ambitious targets 
may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target and that a host country 
can transfer (and sell) abroad. On the other hand, if the Article 6.4. mechanism allows for crediting of activities 
that are beyond the scope of the NDC without requiring the host country to account for exported mitigation 
outcomes from such activities, there is no incentive to expand the scope of the NDC, because this would reduce 
the host country’s potential to obtain external funding. 
This paper explores the complex interaction between ambition raising and the Article 6.4 mechanism, develops 
options on how the mechanism may be designed in order to foster ambition raising and evaluates these options 
regarding their contribution to raising ambition levels, their practicability and feasibility. It finally derives 
conclusions from these findings and presents recommendations to enhance the ambition raising potential  
of the Article 6.4 mechanism.
Please note that this section focuses on design elements of the Paris Agreement and its Article 6.4  
mechanism that allow for “ambition raising” related to Parties’ NDC targets in terms of ambition level and 
scope. Another concept closely related to ambition raising is “overall mitigation”, i. e. the net climate benefit  
of Art. 6.4 activities resulting from the mechanism’s design as such, which is discussed in chapter [see text  
on work package 1.1]. 
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2 The Paris Agreement’s aim for ambition raising and incentives 
from international transfers under Article 6.4
2.1 Ambition raising in the Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement and the decision by the Conference of the Parties adopting the Agreement (Decision 1/
CP.21) contain several elements that underline the importance of increasing ambition over time. 
Article 3 states that the efforts of ‘all Parties’ – collectively – will represent a progression over time. Article 4.3 
states that “each Party‘s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond  
the Party‘s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition”, while 
stressing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light  
of different national circumstances. 
The Paris Agreement establishes a ratcheting mechanism in order to increase ambition over time (Kohli 2015). 
According to Article 4.9, each Party shall communicate an NDC every five years “with a view to enhancing its 
level of ambition” (Article 4.9). Parties may also increase the ambition level of their NDC at any time (Article 
4.11). Each round of NDC submission is preceded by a global stocktake through which the collective progress 
towards the Agreement’s long-term goals is assessed. Parties are required to take into account the outcomes 
 of the global stocktake when formulating their NDCs (Art. 4.9 and 14.3).
Ambition raising is not only related to increasing the target levels of an NDC, but “progression” referred to in 
Article 4.3 may also relate to expanding the coverage (or scope) of the NDC. This is in line with requirements  
of the Paris Agreement: While developed countries “should” adopt economy-wide absolute emission reduction 
targets, developing countries “are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction  
or limitation targets” (Article 4.4). To this aim, developing countries shall be provided support (Article 4.5).
Ambition raising can however also be understood to include an increase of climate actions more generally.  
This broader concept is used in Article 6.1, which states that the voluntary cooperation among Parties is  
“to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions” (Art. 6.1).
At the same time, ambition raising can be discerned from the concept of overall mitigation in global emissions 
(see Wang-Helmreich et al. 2019). Delivering such an overall mitigation in global emissions is one of the aims  
of the Article 6.4 mechanism. The key difference between both concepts is actorness: Overall mitigation is 
achieved by the design of the mechanism while ambition raising is an outcome of individual Parties taking 
action to generate a climate benefit. With overall mitigation, the mitigation outcomes are no longer linked to  
the Parties involved and the Parties’ ambition level stays the same.
In sum, ambition raising can be defined as a process in which Parties enhance their NDC targets and/or  
intensify their mitigation actions. Expanding the concept of ambition raising to include both NDC targets  
and concrete mitigation actions is not only in line with the provisions contained in the Paris Agreement.  
It further allows to achieve both, an enhancement of climate change targets in the mid-term (NDCs) and  
long-term (2050 strategies) as well as an immediate climate impact. The latter aspect is also key, as exclusively 
relying on the (future) enhancement of purely nationally determined targets of NDCs and long-term low green-
house gas emission development strategies cannot be considered a viable pathway to address climate change 
given their lack of legal bindingness. Hence, the use of Article 6.4 would ideally support Parties in achieving 
both, a short-term increase of their mitigation actions and a long-term enhancement of their mitigation targets.
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2.2 Challenges and risks of the Article 6.4 mechanism in contributing  
to ambition raising
Article 6 is explicitly introduced as a means for Parties “to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and 
adaptation actions” (Article 6.1). In theory, allowing for the allocation of resources to actions that provide 
mitigation outcomes at the lowest cost may help to raise ambition in order to achieve the goals of the Paris 
Agreement. Using mitigation outcomes generated abroad and using them for NDC attainment may decrease 
mitigation costs for acquiring countries. This may or may not lead the acquiring countries to pledge more 
ambitious mitigation levels in their NDC, depending on how they make use of the economic rent from internati-
onal transfers. In addition, the use of Article 6 mechanisms may incentivize investments in advanced mitigation 
technologies and sustainable development that are only possible with such cooperative approaches. 
However, the use of international transfers under Article 6.4 may bring various challenges and perverse incen-
tives to raising the ambition of both, host and acquiring countries. The fundamentally new element comes  
with the fact that under the Paris Agreement, in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, all Parties are now expected to 
contribute to the global effort of mitigation, peak their own emissions as soon as possible, and to rapidly reduce 
their emissions thereafter (Article 4.1). 
Host countries: Ambition raising of host countries could be adversely impacted by the Article 6.4 mechanism  
in numerous ways. One potential perverse incentive relates to the scope of Parties’ NDCs: Although developed 
countries should and developed countries are encouraged to move to economy-wide NDCs, the use of the Article 
6.4 mechanism may provide perverse incentives not to do so. If the mechanism allows crediting of activities that 
are beyond the scope of the NDC without requiring the host country to account for exported mitigation 
outcomes from such activities, expanding the scope of the NDC would reduce the host country’s potential  
to obtain external funding.
Article 6.4 may further impact the ambition level of an NDC, as the definition of a country’s NDC has an impact 
on baseline-setting and additionality demonstration of mitigation actions to be credited under the mechanism. 
Setting ambitious targets may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond the NDC target 
and that a host country can transfer (and sell) abroad (Schneider et al 2017; CCAP 2017). Host countries that 
increase their ambition level may lose their (lower cost) mitigation potential, which they might want to mone-
tize under Article 6.4. 
In addition, many NDCs in their current initial form are not yet formulated very clearly and in a quantified 
manner. This includes aspects of NDCs such as the quantification of emission targets, definition of national 
business as usual (BAU) scenarios, scope of NDC, single-year- vs. multi-year-targets etc. Aiming to participate  
in market mechanisms may provide incentives to interpret these NDC targets in an unambitious way, e. g.  
by assuming non-conservative BAU scenarios that allow for more mitigation outcomes to be transferred inter-
nationally.
In addition to these potential perverse incentives, the structure of Article 6.4 mechanism may also entail a  
risk for the host country. Using low-hanging fruits for international transfers may increase the marginal cost  
of additional mitigation potentials and make it costlier for a host country to reach its NDC and to increase  
its ambition level in the future. 
Acquiring countries: From the perspective of the acquiring country, the availability of more cost-effective 
mitigation outcomes from Article 6.4 mitigation activities abroad may entail the risk of reducing investments  
in domestic low carbon technologies and allow for the prolonged use and implementation of high emitting 
technologies (“lock-in” effect). This may hinder the necessary transformation towards a low-carbon economy 
domestically.
From this it appears that without adequate incentives, rules and procedures, the Article 6.4 mechanism may  
fail to achieve its goal of contributing to ambition raising and, on the contrary, may provide numerous perverse 
incentives for host countries not to increase their ambition levels, possibly leading to a race to the bottom.  
The following section develops different options on how to, at least partially, address these challenges.
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3 Options for fostering ambition raising in the context  
of Article 6.4 mechanisms
In the following, we develop four options on how the risks outlined above could be addressed allowing  
Article 6.4 to exert its ambition raising function:
1. Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability 
2. Reconciling the design of the Art. 6.4 mechanism with ambition raising of host countries
3. Supporting the host country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism
4. Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism
This chapter will first describe the options in detail. Subsequently, the options will be evaluated in chapter 4 
with regards to their potential to enhance ambition levels and their practicality in terms of institutional needs, 
data availability etc.
3.1 Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability 
This weakest option to foster ambition raising builds on the comprehensive requirements of the Paris Agreement 
for transparency, reporting and review. Stringent requirements, including on reporting information about 
progress in ambition levels as well as on accounting of all international transfers, could contribute to raising 
ambition. The key is comparability of the targets and ambition levels between different countries and over time. 
More ambitious countries could demonstrate their high ambition levels. In contrast, countries with low ambi-
tion levels may be identified, in particular those who engage in hosting mitigation outcomes for international 
transfers based on their “hot air”. Such information may also be useful for acquiring countries that seek to buy 
mitigation outcomes from countries with sufficiently ambitious NDC targets, preserving environmental integrity. 
The rulebook adopted end of 2018 in Katowice includes guidance on the relevant articles of the Paris Agreement, 
except Article 6. Some of the current provisions allow to increase comparability of targets and progress. 
However, in some cases further guidance or clarity may be needed so that the implementation of the rulebook 
actually allows transparency, reporting and review to contribute to ambition raising through Article 6.4. In the 
following, relevant provisions from the Paris Agreement and rulebook are presented. While an assessment of 
the latter needs a further and more indepth analysis, the text below nevertheless provides some initial propo-
sals on how the provisions could be further developed. 
Upfront information
Each Party is required to provide upfront information through their NDCs. The features of the NDCs and  
the information to be provided by Parties in order to facilitate clarity, transparency, and understanding  
of NDCs (Article 4.8) may contribute to increasing ambition, namely by allowing better comparability of NDCs 
between countries and between different NDC cycles. Consequently, the ambition level at a certain time and  
the increasing ambition over time can be better understood and compared by the different stakeholders.
In their second and subsequent NDCs, Parties need to provide the following information: (i) quantifiable 
information on the reference point, (ii) time frames and/or periods for implementation, (iii) scope and coverage, 
(iv) planning processes, (v) assumptions and methodological approaches, (vi) how the Party considers that its 
NDC is fair and ambitious, in the light of its national circumstances, and (vii) how the NDC contributes towards 
achieving the objective of the Convention. 
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Annex I of decision 4/CMA.1 specifies each of the aforementioned element. Parties are required to provide 
information on the intention to use voluntary cooperation under Article 6 mechanisms, including Article 6.4 
mechanism (see 5(g)). Additionally, Parties are required to describe how their NDC contributes towards the 
objective of the Paris Agreement to holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C 
above preindustrial levels (see 7(b)). There is no further indication on what the information should entail to 
fulfil these requirements. Information may contain a description not only on how, but also to what extent  
(quantified amount) Article 6 mechanisms are used. Additionally, information may contain a description  
on how the use of Article 6 mechanisms allows the Party to have “higher ambition in their mitigation actions” 
(Article 6.1) and increase ambition in its current and future NDCs. 
Quantifiability in terms of CO2-eq is another relevant feature. Annex I of decision 4/CMA.1 requires Parties  
to provide quantifiable information (1 (a–f)). While there seems to be a certain leeway (see 1(c)), Parties are 
required to provide information on reference years or other starting points, a target relative to the reference 
indicator expressed numerically, and quantifiable information on the reference indicators at the starting points 
and in the target year. Quantifiable targets and baselines for NDCs are particularly important if the mitigation 
outcomes transferred are from within a host country’s NDC. Amongst others, it helps the host country to under-
stand what amount it can transfer without risking to not achieve its own (ambitious) NDC. On the acquiring 
country’s side, such information is relevant to understand what can be achieved through domestic actions  
and how much international transfers are needed to achieve its own (ambitious) NDC.
Annex I of decision 4/CMA.1 requires information on the planning process that a Party undertook to prepare  
its NDC (4 (a)). While not explicitly mentioned, such information could also entail a link to a Party’s long-term 
strategy or how it considers the formulated target to fit into its long-term mitigation actions and decarboniza-
tion. Together with the information on Article 6 mechanisms this would help to understand if short term gains 
are favored instead of a long-term decarbonization. 
As outlined above, Annex I of decision 4/CMA.1 already contains several requirements for relevant information 
to assess ambition. However, some of the above mentioned and more detailed information necessary for asses-
sing ambition raising through Article 6.4 mechanism is not explicitly mentioned. It could be decided – for 
example by the supervisory body of Article 6.4 mechanism or a “club” of acquiring countries – that these 
requirements are only to be fulfilled by those Parties deciding to make use of Article 6.4 mechanism.
Transparency framework and review
Article 13 establishes an enhanced transparency framework for action and support. This framework is the main 
mechanism to hold states accountable for the implementation of their NDCs. The modalities, procedures and 
guidelines have been specified through decision 18/CMA.1. While they are common to all Parties, there is  
a certain flexibility foreseen for those developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities 
(Article 13.2). Parties making use of the flexibility have to indicate the capacity constraints that make the 
flexibility necessary and provide time frames for improvements (see para. 6 of annex to decision 18/CMA.1).
Parties are required to provide national inventory reports as well as information necessary to track progress 
made in implementing and achieving their NDCs (Article 13.7). The annex of decision 18/CMA.1 outlines the 
information that Parties need to provide. For example, with regard to Article 6, Parties have to provide (para. 76 
(d)) a description on how double counting of net GHG emission reductions has been avoided, or (para. 77 (d)) 
an emission balance reflecting the level of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks covered 
by their NDC adjusted on the basis of corresponding adjustments (assuming that the Article 6.4 mechanism  
is considered a cooperative approach). For additional information that might be necessary requirements could 
be included in the guidance for Article 6, which still needs to be developed, additional guidance established  
by the Article 6.4 supervisory body or a “club” of acquiring countries. For example, Parties could be asked  
to provide specific information on how Article 6.4 use has allowed them to increase ambition. 
There is a two-step review process common to all Parties (Articles 13.11 and 13.12): First, there is a technical 
expert review, checking consistency of the information with the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the 
transparency framework. Second, there is a multilateral consideration of progress. As recognized in the annex 
to decision 18/CMA.1, technical expert teams have to include members with knowledge on Article 6, if relevant 
for the information to be reviewed. This is necessary to review the information provided by parties on the Article 
6.4 use and how it e. g. helped them to increase ambition.
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The purpose of the framework for transparency of action is to provide not only clarity and tracking of progress 
towards achieving Parties’ individual NDCs, but to also include good practices, priorities, needs and gaps  
to inform the global stocktake under Article 14 (see also Article 13.5). Amongst others, good practices with 
regard to ambition raising through Article 6.4 could be identified and provided as input to the global stocktake. 
As outlined above, Annex I of decision 4/CMA.1 already contains some requirements for relevant information  
to assess ambition raising through Article 6.4. However, the annex refers in some cases to guidance related  
to Article 6 that still needs to be developed. Additionally, some of the above mentioned and more detailed 
information necessary could also be part of reporting requirements established by the Article 6.4 supervisory 
body or a “club” of acquiring countries.
Global Stocktake
Article 14 establishes a global stocktake on the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective 
progress. It is a key element of the ratcheting mechanism to increase ambition over time.
The assessment not only includes progress towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement, but also its 
long-term goals (Article 14.1). Thus, as noted above, it allows a feedback mechanism connecting the current 
climate action with the long-term targets of the Paris Agreement (Northrop et al. 2018). The outcome of the 
global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing their NDCs as well as enhance international 
cooperation for climate action (Article 14.3). While Parties are required to take into account the outcome of  
the global stocktake in their NDCs (Article 4.9), it remains a nationally determined process on how and to what 
extent they want to profit from the information. The first stocktake will take place in 2023 and every five years 
thereafter (Article 14.2).
The mandate of Article 14 is limited, as it only assesses the progress expost and on an aggregate level. Neverthe-
less, such an assessment could include information on the extent of Article 6.4 use. The assessment could 
include information on how the use of Article 6.4 mechanism has actually helped Parties to achieve their 
targets and increase ambition. Lessons learned and best practices could be provided in order to improve the  
use of Article 6.4 mechanism in future NDC cycles so that they allow Parties to increase the ambition levels  
in their NDCs. 
Hermwille and Siemons (2018) propose that the global stocktake could also implicitly or explicitly determine 
points of references for ambition, possibly for country groupings, based on parameters such as the level of 
emissions, state of development, or sectoral benchmarks. Such points of references could then be used by 
national policy makers and civil society organizations to assess the NDCs of the following cycle (Hermwille  
and Siemons 2018). Such points of references could include Article 6.4 use. Alternatively, points of references 
could also be developed by civil society or a “club” of acquiring countries, based on the global stocktake.
Compliance Mechanism
Article 15 of the Paris Agreement establishes a mechanism “to facilitate implementation” and “promote compli-
ance”. In December 2018 in Katowice, Parties have agreed in the rulebook on the modalities and procedures  
for the effective operation of this mechanism and its committee. The committee may consider an issue in the 
following cases (paragraph 20, 22, 32 of decision 20/CMA.1): first, if a party provides a submission on its own 
implementation or compliance; second, if a party has failed to submit an NDC, a mandatory inventory or report; 
third, if a party has not participated in the facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress; fourth, in case  
of persistent and significant inconsistencies with the Article 13 modalities, procedures and guidelines; fifth,  
in case of systematic issues. 
Further analysis is necessary to understand the implications of adopted modalities and procedures of Article 15 
for Article 6 and ambition raising. For example, the fourth option seems interesting as it may include issues 
related to reporting progress by parties using the Article 6 mechanisms. The first option would allow the 
mechanism to also address challenges of individual Parties in implementing their NDCs and increasing  
ambition, including through the Article 6.4 mechanism. However, and based on the experience with  
other compliance mechanisms, it remains to be seen to what extent this option will be used.
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3.2 Reconciling the design of the Article 6.4 mechanism  
with ambition raising of host countries
This section considers ways to design the rules, modalities and procedures that operationalize the Article 6.4 
mechanism in such a way that allows countries to raise their ambition without being negatively affected in their 
role as Article 6.4 host countries. In addition, this section discusses design options that allow the Article 6.4 
mechanism to exert its function as ambition raising. These options could be implemented on a CMA-level or  
by the ruling of the considered Supervisory Body under Article 6.4. In absence of such an international ruling,  
an acquiring or host country or a group of countries (“club”) could decide to implement these design options  
on a regional or national level, or even on the project level through the inclusion in an emission reductions 
purchase agreement. The acquiring countries could complement such rulemaking by providing support  
to host countries (see also section 3.3). 
The following approaches build on earlier work of Schneider et al. (2017) and Warnecke et al. (2018)  
Howard (2018), Kreibich (2018). They are key issues in the ongoing negotiations for Article 6.
Table 1: Options to address perverse incentives and make Art. 6.4 an ambition raising mechanism 
Option Suboption Perverse incentive  or risk addressed
Contribution  
to ambition raising
Requiring host countries  
to also account for exported 
mitigation outcomes that  
were generated outside  
the scope of their NDC
YES, the perverse incentive 
to maintain the scope of the 
NDC narrow is addressed
–
Restricting crediting periods 
and adjusting baselines in 
alignment with the 5-year  
NDC cycle
YES, risk mitigated –
Requiring ambitious crediting 
baselines
YES, the incentive to adopt 
unambitious NDC targets is 
addressed. 
Defining eligibility criteria  
for Article 6.4 mechanism  
(relating to NDC targets)
Coverage of NDC 
targets
YES, countries are  
incentivised to expand  
the scope of their NDC.
Engaging in long-term 
strategies
YES, the incentive  
to exclusively focus on  
the short-term cost-savings 
from offsetting is addressed.
YES, countries would be 
required to demonstrate  
how they intend to use  
Art. 6.4 for ambition raising.
Restricting eligibility 
of technologies or 
types of action within 
the scope of the NDC
YES, by restricting eligibility 
to actions within the scope 
of the NDC the incentive  
to maintain a narrow scope 
is addressed. 
Requiring ambitious 
and quantified NDC 
targets
YES YES
Requiring inclusion of  
emissions targeted by  
Art. 6.4 activity into future NDC
YES, by requiring the  
inclusion of emissions into 
future NDCs the incentive  
to maintain a narrow scope 
is addressed.
YES, requiring the inclusion 
of emissions into future NDCs 
expands the scope of NDCs. 
Quality of the mitigation  
outcomes
YES, quality of MO  
as necessary prerequisite 
enabling ambition raising  
in subsequent NDC cycles
–
Comments in text below, for e. g. references and explanations
Options for fostering increasing ambition levels under the Paris Article 6.4 Mechanism – Discussion Paper20
Requiring host countries to also account for exported mitigation outcomes that were 
generated outside the scope of their NDC
If host countries are allowed to export mitigation outcomes that were generated outside the scope of their NDC 
there could be a perverse incentive to maintain the scope of their NDC narrow, in order to be able to export a 
larger amount of mitigation outcomes without having to implement corresponding adjustments. This perverse 
incentive could be addressed by requiring host countries to also account for exported mitigation outcomes that 
were generated outside the scope of their NDC and to carry out corresponding adjustments also for these 
mitigation outcomes.
Restricting crediting periods and adjusting baselines in alignment with the 5-year NDC cycle
The period over which outcomes from a specific mitigation activity could be internationally transferred might be 
limited, possibly aligned with the NDC cycle. Restricting crediting periods prevents the lockin of mitigation 
potential in the host country. If crediting periods were much longer (e. g. 21 years as is possible in the CDM), 
then the host country would not be able to use these mitigation potentials over a long time period and the 
related corresponding adjustments would burden the adjusted national emissions balance for a long period, 
making it more difficult for host countries to ratchet-up their NDC target. Limiting crediting periods combined 
with the inclusion of emission reduction into future NDC targets (see below) can further contribute to ambition 
raising.
Restricting crediting periods is applied already under the CDM. For instance, under the CDM project proponents 
may choose between one ten-year crediting period or three seven-year periods with a reassessment of the 
baseline for each new period. These timeframes appear rather long compared with the shorter five-year NDC 
cycles foreseen in the Paris Agreement.
In addition, shorter crediting periods may increase environmental integrity, because scenarios for crediting 
baselines can change over the time. They are difficult to estimate over longer time periods. Especially for 
complex and dynamic areas, the baseline uncertainty may increase and become larger than the considered 
emission reduction (i. e. the issue of “signal-to-noise-ratio”, see Fuessler et al. (NMM Part II)). Restricting 
crediting periods and aligning them with the 5-year cycle of updating NDCs would remove uncertainties  
with regard to the mitigation outcomes that are transferred (Schneider et al. 2017). 
Requiring ambitious crediting baselines
Host countries have an incentive to set unambitious NDC targets or inflate baseline emission projections  
to which these targets are tied, in order to allow to transfer more mitigation outcomes. One possibility would  
be to require the baselines for generating mitigation outcomes in subsequent NDCs to be based on emission 
levels achieved in previous NDCs, including any mitigation outcomes transferred (Warnecke et al. 2018). 
Alternatively, baselines could be determined at the international level by the Supervisory Body of the Aricle 6.4 
Mechanism, as suggested by Michaelowa and Butzengeiger (2017). Only activities in countries that agree to  
an international review of their NDC’s ambition level and where this review determines that the NDC does not 
contain hot air would be automatically deemed additional. 
Defining eligibility criteria for the Article 6.4 mechanism (relating to NDC targets)
Participation by parties in Article 6.4 mechanism could be subject to eligibility criteria contributing to ambition 
raising.
Explicit and implicit eligibility criteria have already been used under the CDM. For example, participating 
parties need to nominate a designated national authority responsible for authorizing projects, some technolo-
gies (e. g. nuclear) where ruled out and only those project types where applicable where a corresponding CDM 
methodology has been approved (see further examples in Schneider et al. 2017).
21Options for fostering increasing ambition levels under the Paris Article 6.4 Mechanism – Discussion Paper
Coverage of NDC targets
Participation could be restricted to Parties with economy-wide targets in their NDCs (see also Warnecke et al. 
2018). According to Article 4.4, developed country Parties should undertake economy-wide absolute emission 
reduction targets and also developing country Parties are encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide 
emission reduction or limitation targets. A requirement for economy-wide emission reduction targets would 
actively encourage Parties to move more quickly towards economy-wide targets than they would have done 
without Article 6.4 mechanism. Since such a requirement might be challenging to fulfill for some potential host 
parties, one could also allow for these countries to only provide a clear plan for the adoption of economy-wide 
targets (Warnecke et al. 2018). Such countries could possibly receive support in capacity building in doing so 
(see section 3.3 further below).
Engaging in long-term strategies
Engaging in a process to develop and communicate long-term strategies according to Article 4.19 could also  
be a prerequisite for both acquiring and host parties to participate in the Article 4.6 mechanism: 
Without long-term strategies, acquiring countries risk to not achieve the transition towards low-emission 
development because they do not sufficiently invest in technological advancements on the national level. 
Host countries risk that they do not consider the implications of using Article 6.4 mechanism on achieving  
their own NDC target as well as for ambition raising in the future. In long-term strategies, participating  
countries could be required to demonstrate how they intend to increase the ambition of their targets in future 
NDC cycles, by using Article 6.4 mechanism without undermining the achievement of their own NDC target, 
and on focusing long-term decarbonisation instead of short-term gains only (see also Warnecke et al. 2018, 
CCAP 2017 and further below). 
Restricting eligibility of technologies or types of action
Eligibility of actions could be restricted to sectors, technologies and actions within the scope of NDCs  
(see also Warnecke et al. 2018). This would avoid disincentives to not include actions in NDCs. 
Based on positive and/or negative lists of technologies, only certain activities would be allowed for transferring 
emission outcomes under Article 6.4 mechanism. The CDM applied positive lists in small and micro-scale 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects/programs. On how these lists could be defined, see elabora-
tions below in chapter 3.3.
Requiring ambitious and quantified NDC targets
Parties are required to set ambitious NDC targets (Article 4.3), for which certain safeguards can be formulated. 
This not only contributes to avoiding the transfer of hot air and undermining the overall ambition, but it also 
contributes to raising the individual ambition of NDCs. Assessing the level of ambition in NDCs is difficult, but  
it is necessary to get an idea on how Article 6.4 contributes to raising ambition (Howard 2018). As a minimum, 
participating parties could be required to demonstrate how their NDC targets are more stringent than their BAU 
emissions. This is a minimum requirement that could be combined with the requirement that the baselines in 
each NDC cycle need to be based on the actual emissions in the previous cycle (see above). In addition, all 
parties participating in Article 6.4 mechanism could be required to provide information necessary for clarity, 
transparency and understanding (Article 4.8) on how they consider their target to be the highest possible 
ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light  
of different national circumstances (Article 4.3) (see also Schneider et al. 2017). What the information should 
be can be defined based on the guidelines currently developed on paragraph 28 of decision 1/CP.21 on NDCs.
Another eligibility criteria could be that only parties with quantified NDC targets are allowed to trade emission 
outcomes. This would facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally determined contributions 
(Article 4.8), what the transferred mitigation outcomes are and how the corresponding adjustments have been 
applied. 
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Application of eligibility criteria
The eligibility criteria could be applied strictly, so that only parties fulfilling all criteria can participate in Article 
6.4 mechanisms. However, a less strict application could also be required to limit the quantities of emission 
outcomes that can be transferred from countries that do not fulfil all criteria (see also Schneider et al. 2017).
Eligibility criteria that for example would only allow for international transfers from host countries that have 
NDCs with a “sufficient level of ambition” and which can demonstrate progress towards more comprehensive 
and more ambitious NDCs over time would prevent the competition with host countries that have unambitious 
NDCs and can therefore transfer more mitigation outcomes internationally and at a lower cost. In practice 
however, it is politically very difficult to agree between parties on what adequate ambition levels are.  
As such eligibility criteria may not be implemented on a CMA level, some acquiring countries (or clubs of  
buying countries) may require an objective demonstration from potential host countries that their NDC’s 
ambition level is adequate and that the country has a strategy on how to increase ambition levels over time.  
For instance, Switzerland takes the NDC of prospective host countries into account when selecting potential 
suppliers in the carbon market pilot scheme.
Requiring inclusion of emissions targeted by Article 6.4 activity into future NDC
If the scope of Article 6.4 is not limited to activities within the scope of NDCs, host parties could also be required 
to include sectors and technologies that are used in Article 6.4 mechanism during one NDC cycle to their NDC  
in future cycles (see also above on restricting crediting periods). This is a contribution to ambition raising,  
as the scope of the NDC would be increased. At the same time, this measure would address the incentive  
for countries to maintain a narrow scope of the NDC is addressed.
Quality of the mitigation outcomes
Units that lack quality increase global greenhouse gas emissions. Under crediting mechanisms, the quality  
of credits is ensured if the emission reductions are additional, not overestimated, and permanent (or provisions 
are in place to address non-permanence). Additionally, robust accounting needs to be applied. 
Units that lack quality may also be a risk for host countries not to achieve their NDC target. In case a mitigation 
outcome is transferred from within a party’s NDC, quality of unit is important for the host country to assess  
if it still achieves its own NDC target.1 This is particularly true if the transfer happens before the target year or 
period, because the host country may have to compensate for the transfer of units that lack quality (Schneider  
et al. 2017). International rules may be important to assure unit quality. 
In case the host country is required to integrate the activities used for Article 6.4 mechanism in its future NDC,  
it seems particularly important to assure unit quality. Otherwise the host country risks that it has to compensate 
in the future for low quality units.
1 Units have quality if the 6.4 mechanism ensures that the issuance or transfer of one unit, defined as 1 t CO2eq, directly leads to an emission reduction of at 
least 1 t CO2eq in the host country, compared to the situation in the absence of the mechanism (Schneider et al 2017)
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3.3 Supporting the host country to raise ambition through  
the Article 6.4 mechanism
In the following, options are presented how other parties, bi- and multilateral institutions and initiatives could 
support host countries in fulfilling the requirements outlined in the previous section. Some of the requirements 
outlined in 3.2 are challenging to fulfil, especially for certain host countries. This may lead to the exclusion of 
some countries to participate in Article 6.4 mechanism and, in turn, hinder increasing ambition. Therefore, 
support for those countries that need it may contribute to raising ambition of NDCs through Article 6.4 mecha-
nism. Such support could also be part of the Article 6.4 mechanism.
Support ambitious target-setting and long-term planning activities
National mitigation planning processes leading to a long-term strategy are important to define and progress in 
NDC targets. A well-established planning process may help a party to set ambitious targets, achieve ambitious 
mitigation outcomes in the short as well as long term, and to participate in the Article 6.4 mechanism while 
managing the risk of non-achievement of the own NDC targets (Schneider et al. 2017). Limited and incomplete 
planning processes can be a reason for unambitious, unclear and incomplete NDCs, amongst others because 
reference scenarios are unknown. Planning processes have been implemented in several countries in the 
context of the regular domestic climate policies and measures including the Low Emission Development  
Strategies (LEDS) or Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios (MAPS). 
Article 4.19 of the Paris Agreement encourages Parties ‘to formulate and communicate long-term low green-
house gas emission development strategies’. At COP 23 end of 2017, several parties proposed linking potential 
participation in Article 6 mechanisms to long-term decarbonisation strategies (Warnecke et al. 2018). Requiring 
long-term strategies that explicitly identify the role of Article 6.4 mechanism would help to analyze the impacts 
of the Article 6.4 mechanism on the achievement of a Party’s own NDC target and how it may help to increase 
ambition and achieving long-term mitigation goals. By September 2018, nine parties have submitted a long-
term low greenhouse gas emission development strategy under Article 4.19 of the Paris Agreement. In addition, 
many (developed) countries elaborate and communicate long-term strategies in the context of their National 
Communications under the UN-FCCC and in other international or domestic fora (e. g. the Deep Decarbonisation 
Pathway Project (DDPP)).
Host countries might be required to provide answers to the following challenges and questions related  
to their long-term strategies (CCAP 2017):
▸	 How will the NDC scope expand over time and how can Article 6.4 participation help, through the inflow  
of finance, technology and capacity, to incorporate sectors/activities into subsequent NDCs and increase 
ambition?
▸	 What mitigation pathways are required or possible for achieving domestic NDC targets and how does  
participation in Article 6.4 allow or help getting on this pathway?
▸	 How can be assured that using the Article 6.4 mechanism does not prioritize short-term gains over long-term 
decarbonization and how it may even encourage long-term decarbonisation? 
Formulating ambitious targets and long-term strategies is not easy. Particularly developing references and 
mitigation scenarios are a very complex task (Novikova et al. 2016). Many host countries lack relevant infor-
mation e. g. in their greenhouse gas inventories and know-how for defining future pathways based on assump-
tions related to e. g. economic growth, developments in economic sectors, or effects on emission sources.  
Thus, there is a need of some host countries for support and capacity building. 
This support may come through existing international financing mechanisms and bilateral cooperation  
(see also Warnecke et al. 2018 or Howard 2018). However, there could also be a collaboration between an 
individual acquiring country or a coalition of acquiring countries with potential host countries. An example  
for such a complementary approach is the work of the World Bank’s Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) 
capacity building initiative, supporting host countries in their mitigation planning processes and development 
of domestic MRV capabilities and mitigation instruments. This capacity building then allows for other World 
Bank carbon facilities such as the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF) to engage with these host 
countries in using the Article 6.4 mechanism. 
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Facilitate investments in new low-carbon technologies
The Article 6.4 mechanism should facilitate investments in technologies in a host country that would be unable 
to make such investments unilaterally (see Warnecke et al. 2018 on the importance of identifying inaccessible 
technologies). This may accelerate technology diffusion to host countries allowing them to raise ambition in 
their future NDCs. It is not only in the interest of the international community, but may also be a host countries’ 
priority to identify activities that are particularly suitable for the Article 6.4 mechanism. If a host country sells 
its cheapest mitigation options that could well be implemented domestically, it is left with only the more 
expensive abatement options for the achievement of its NDC target.
Host countries may focus or even restrict their use of the Article 6.4 mechanism to sectors/ project types that 
facilitate investments to technologies where specific local barriers of technology, know-how and finance limit  
a purely domestic uptake and where international cooperation is necessary for their transformational imple-
mentation (Warnecke et al. 2018). See also section 3.2.
In order to assess whether an activity involves an “inaccessible” technology for a country, the maturity of the 
technology for a specific country or region, if not globally, and the costs need to be considered (Warnecke et  
al. 2018). There could be an international negative list for low-cost, mature technologies and an international 
positive list for (higher cost) emerging technologies. In addition, there is a “grey zone” of high-cost, mature 
technologies and low-cost, emerging technologies, which needs careful investigation, taking into account the 
domestic context of the host country (Warnecke et al. 2018). There are major differences between regions and 
countries with regard to technologies, so that the inaccessibility of technologies in the “grey zone” needs to  
be analysed for each country or a group of countries individually. This could be done through internationally 
developed decision trees or eligibility criteria (Schneider et al 2017). Through a national self-assessment,  
the decision tree or eligibility criteria could be applied to develop the national lists, which would then be 
interna tionally reviewed, e. g. through a peer review process (Warnecke et al. 2018).
As mentioned above, it is also in the host country’s interest to identify the inaccessibility of technologies. 
However, the task of establishing national positive and negative lists is very challenging. In addition, national 
actors overseeing Article 6.4 participation in their countries need to be able to assess activities proposed by  
the private sector. Therefore, support for host country’s readiness to participate in Article 6.4 mechanism 
should be available – either through international mechanisms or bilateral agreements for capacity building 
and financial support.
The positive and negative lists need to be regularly updated, ideally in alignment with the 5-year cycle  
of the NDCs. An update every five (or ten) years would allow to take into account new developments such  
as the diffusion and costs of technologies, changes to GDP or know how of a country.
3.4 Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through  
the Article 6.4 mechanism
The mitigation outcomes purchased by acquiring countries can be used by the acquiring countries to reach their 
NDC target. An acquiring country may, however, also decide to cancel (a part of) the mitigation outcomes it has 
acquired and thus increase its ambition. While such a voluntary cancellation implies units to be issued, the 
acquiring country may also implement a corresponding adjustment by unilaterally adjusting its NDC target  
or its emissions level according to the amount of mitigation outcomes acquired. In addition to this short-term 
ambition raising impact, countries could also use the purchase of Article 6.4 mitigation outcomes to increase  
its ambition level in the long run. 
Four cases can be identified in which countries buy mitigation outcomes from abroad, leading to increased 
ambitions under certain conditions: 
1. Using lower compliance costs for ambition raising: The country is lowering its cost of compliance with its 
NDC target if the implementation of policies that would be necessary to reach the NDC has higher marginal 
abatement costs than the purchase of the mitigation out-comes from the Article 6.4 mechanism. If the 
acquiring country invests the savings in domestic reductions or international climate finance, this can lead 
to increased ambition.
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2. Increasing ambition with long-term strategies: Embedding purchase of mitigation out-comes in long-term 
strategies and clear communication of these strategies.
3. Increasing ambition through risk reduction: The country bears a risk of not being able to attain its NDC 
target due to financial or technical constraints. Mitigation outcomes are acquired to hedge the risk.
4. “Insetting”: Linking use of mitigation outcomes to domestic mitigation activities: Countries wishing to use 
mitigation outcomes from abroad to achieve their NDC could voluntarily commit to carry out additional 
domestic reductions.
Using lower compliance costs for ambition raising
Countries with very high mitigation costs have incentives to buy mitigation outcomes up to the point where  
their own marginal abatement costs are equal to the price of mitigation outcomes from abroad. If this trade is 
conducted with environmental integrity and the mitigation outcomes are not discounted, the trade has no 
impact on global emissions. However, emissions are reduced by trading with mitigation outcomes exactly  
where this is financially most favorable. This not only benefits the acquiring country through lower costs,  
but also the host country through income from the sale of mitigation out-comes.
Spalding-Fecher et al. (2012) consider the EU ETS region as acquiring countries, they show that the savings  
in the second trading period of the EU ETS for private companies were estimated at least 2.3 billion dollars 
(rather higher, since the price decline of the EUA that was caused by the availability of CERs was not included  
in this calculation). Government savings over this period are estimated at around $1.3 billion. 
The cost reduction achieved by trading mitigation outcomes can have two consequences. On the one hand, 
necessary investments in low carbon technologies in the acquiring country are not being made, which leads  
to higher emissions in the acquiring country than would be the case without trading of mitigation outcomes 
(CCAP 2017). This effect becomes apparent in the medium to long term when mitigation outcomes from abroad 
become scarcer. Meeting the NDC of the acquiring country becomes more expensive due to higher prices for 
mitigation outcomes and cannot be reached domestically due to a lack of necessary long-term investments  
in low carbon technologies.
On the other hand, the benefits achieved by trading with mitigation outcomes could encourage policy-makers  
to raise ambitions. This can be achieved by three different options. 
1. Fixed investment volume in low carbon technologies: 
The benefits achieved could be invested in low carbon technologies at the national level. However, these 
investments alone are not enough to increase ambition, as they ultimately only lead to lower domestic ab ate-
ment costs in reaching the NDC. But, the acquiring country could set itself a fixed investment volume that 
corresponds, for example, to the investment volume required to achieve the NDC without the possibility of 
acquiring mitigation outcomes. This case would lead to an increase in ambition, provided that the country 
invests the money into mitigation activities. However, this would not happen without incentives, as actors  
tend to take short-term secure profits rather than invest them in an uncertain future. 
2. Strengthen targets:
Policy makers could be encouraged by the lower expected mitigation costs due to trading of mitigation 
outcomes to make more ambitious commitments than would be possible without trading. Spalding-Fecher et al. 
(2012) investigate whether the establishment of the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol has increased the ambition 
of Annex I countries. Interviews with negotiators from Annex I countries, carried out as part of the report‘s 
research, confirmed that the inclusion of the CDM in the Kyoto Protocol had no quantitative impact on the 
Annex I commitments. However, negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol took place more than 20 years ago and 
since then a lot has been learned about carbon pricing and emissions trading and climate change has also 
become more prominent in public opinion. These changing conditions may lead to negotiators today being 
more willing to pursue more ambitious NDCs due to the financial benefits of trading mitigation outcomes. 
However, it is not confirmed that acquiring countries actually set more ambitious targets because of the possi-
bility to use international carbon markets.
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3. Strengthen domestic instruments:
Howard (2018) describes another instrument that enables increased ambitions through lower compliance costs. 
According to Howard, an effective instrument is the strengthening of domestic compliance obligations for 
emitters under an ETS or CO2 tax. These stronger obligations could be set for example, by lowering targets, 
tightening allocation rules, increasing coverage to include new emission sources or in the case of a tax by higher 
tax rates. The ability for emitters to use mitigation outcomes generated under Article 6.4 from international 
sources under their ETS or tax obligations can raise lower costs and support strong emission targets for emitters. 
According to Howard it would be important that the strengthened ETS or tax obligations are not offset by 
relaxing other contributions – either by relaxing other components of the country‘s NDC or by reselling 
acquired reductions to other countries as compensation for their NDCs. The impact of the increase in ambition 
would have to be safeguarded by reserving the increased mitigation efforts and reporting them to the UNFCCC 
as an achievement of an enhanced NDC or as an over-achievement of an NDC. In contrast to 2., where only the 
possibility of trading mitigation outcomes could strengthen the negotiated NDCs, in this case it becomes clear 
how the linking of national instruments such as an ETS or a CO2 tax with mitigation outcomes can achieve 
increases in ambition.
Increasing ambition with long-term strategies
The CCAP report (2017) identifies long-term strategies as a suitable instrument not only to eliminate the 
abovementioned perverse incentives, but also to achieve increases in ambition. Long-term strategies are used  
as a basis to demonstrate the complementarity between the acquisition of mitigation out-comes and domestic 
action. It should be clearly communicated which sectors have problems to achieve short-term reduction targets, 
what makes the acquisition of mitigation outcomes necessary and which measures the policy plans to support 
the transformation. A clear communication about the time period for the planned acquisition of mitigation 
outcomes and the volume is important. Furthermore emissions and compliance projections without the acqui-
sition of mitigation outcomes and projected emissions/compliance with use of mitigation outcomes (CCAP 
2017) should also be well communicated, which illustrates how trading mitigation outcomes can have a 
positive impact on the development of decarbonization. Such communicated long-term strategies clearly show 
which goals are to be pursued and when these must be met. In this way, they give the acting parties certainty 
with regard to the planning of necessary investments. Long-term strategies thus prevent the lack of necessary 
investments. The elimination of the perverse incentive by the long-term strategy leads to higher investments 
than without a long-term strategy and thus to increased ambition. Long-term strategies, which include, for 
example, the contribution of a country to the achievement of the 2 °C target, sometimes represent a more 
ambitious plan than to pursue only a five-year NDC. An orientation towards such a long-term strategy would 
thus increase ambition in the present compared to the goal of NDC achievement. Under these circumstances,  
a long-term strategy contributes to increasing ambition not only by eliminating the perverse incentive,  
but also directly through higher long-term reduction targets.
Risk reduction
When countries set their NDCs based on available budgets and technologies, they have an incentive to design 
them in a way that they are likely to be met (Höhne et al. 2016). This applies to countries with limited political 
will to fight climate change but also to those that have made climate change mitigation a political priority.  
This leads to the NDC targets being weaker than they would be in an optimal case. An optimal NDC, in simp-
lified terms, would have to be set to an average of all projections for a given budget and technology level.  
An optimal NDC would however, mean that the probability of reaching the NDC would not be well above  
50 percent. In a world where there is no transfer of mitigation outcomes, such NDCs would not be adopted 
because the risk of not reaching them would be too high. In a world that allows the international exchange  
of mitigation outcomes, countries are able to set such NDCs without significant risk, as they can acquire miti-
gation outcomes if the NDC is not reached through domestic measures. Transferring mitigation outcomes  
can thus help countries to set their NDCs at an optimal and thus higher level than without trade. 
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It should be noted, however, that if decision-makers continue to set their NDC conservatively, there would be  
an oversupply of mitigation outcomes leading to globally lower investments into low carbon technologies than 
optimal. In order to counteract this effect, acquiring countries could be encouraged to buy-up and cancel 
mitigation outcomes in order to increase their ambition. According to Kreibich (2018), an efficient measure  
to prevent conservatively set NDC targets could be that countries that are willing to enter into cooperation under 
Article 6 are required by the UNFCCC to adopt a NDC with specific characteristics in order to prevent the genera-
tion of an oversupply of mitigation outcomes at its core.
“Insetting”: Linking use of mitigation outcomes to domestic mitigation activities
Kreibich (2018) describes a fourth way of increasing the ambition of acquiring countries by using mitigation 
outcomes. In this case, countries wanting to import mitigation outcomes from abroad and use them for NDC 
attainment could decide to carry out additional domestic reductions that are linked to the mitigation outcomes 
acquired. The link could be via technology, incentive structure or the quantity of greenhouse gas reductions.  
If, for example, the mitigation outcomes imported and the domestic measures are linked via technology,  
the acquiring country could decide that with the purchase of mitigation outcomes from a certain project type, 
say solar PV, an additional investment will be made to foster solar PV domestically. The scale of the domestic 
investment could be equivalent to the amount spent for the mitigation outcomes imported. 
In order to have a real ambition raising impact, the acquiring country would have to ensure that the domestic 
measures are additional and do not contribute to the achievement of the NDC. While this option seems to be 
fully compatible with well-known principles, such as supplementarity, it can be expected to be associated with 
significant challenges when being implemented. Linking the transfer of mitigation outcomes to the implemen-
tation of or support for a domestic policy could raise significant opposition, including from the transferring 
Party.
In summary, it can be said that all four possibilities described do not automatically lead to increased ambitions. 
Incentives and obligations are also necessary so that the use of mitigation outcomes leads to the desired 
increase in ambition. In all cases it also depends on how motivated political decision makers are in designing 
efficient mechanisms or to set ambitious climate protection targets, whether the trade of mitigation outcomes 
leads to increased ambition in the acquiring country.
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4 Evaluation of options and recommendations
4.1 Overview and assessment of options
The following table summarizes the options presented in the previous chapter. It provides an overview  
of their impact on ambition raising as well as the possibilities for their implementation are presented.  
In addition, it provides an assessment of the different options’ political feasibility.
Table 2: Assessment of the options 





1) Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability
Upfront  
information
Indirect impact through  
transparency and comparability 
of ambition and intended Article 
6.4 use.
More detailed guidelines could 
be added through guidelines  
by the 6.4 supervisory body  
or a “club”.
Some countries might need  
support to provide necessary 
data.
General guidelines on clarity, 
transparency, and understanding 
of NDCs are included in  
the rulebook.
In the rulebook.
Further requirements  
through the 6.4  





Indirect impact through trans-
parency and comparability  
of Article 6.4 use, achievement  
of NDC target and ambition.
General guidelines on reporting 
and modalities and procedures  
of the transparency framework 
are included in the rulebook.
More detailed guidelines could 
be added through separate re-
porting requirements established 
by the 6.4 supervisory body or  
a “club”.
Some countries might need  
support to provide necessary 
data.
In the rulebook, but further 
guidance to be developed 
for Article 6 and these ne-
gotiations seem difficult.
Other possibilities such  
as the 6.4 supervisory 
body or a “club”:  
politically feasible.
Global Stock-take
Indirect impact through trans-
parency on progress, including 
the effect of Article 6.4 use, and 
possibly through comparability of 
ambition with points of referen-
ces. 
The modalities for the global 
stocktake are included in the 
rulebook.
Additionally or alternatively, 
“clubs” or stakeholders from civil 
society could make independent 
assessments.
Demonstrating the added 
value of Article 6.4 mecha-
nism in the collective 
progress is not explicitly 
mentioned in the rulebook 
but seems feasible.
Points of references  
for ambition are not  
mentioned in the rulebook 
and seem difficult,  
because it could be  
perceived as a tool for 
exante assessments.
Other possibilities such 




Indirect impact by addressing 
challenges of individual Parties 
in implementing their NDCs and 
increasing ambition.
The modalities and procedures 
are included in the rulebook.
In the rulebook, but impact 
depends also on operati-
onalisation through the 
Committee.
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2) Reconciling the design of the Art. 6.4 mechanism with ambition raising of host countries
Requiring host 





outside the scope 
of their NDC
Addresses the perverse incentive 
to maintain the scope of the NDC 
narrow.
Integrate in the rules, modalities 
and procedures for Article 6.4 
mechanism.
Other possibilities would be de-
cisions by the supervisory body 
or “club”.
Part of Article 6.4  
negotiations. Possible
Restricting credi-
ting periods and 
adjusting base-
lines in alignment 
with the 5-year 
NDC cycle
Mitigates the risk to lock-in 
mitigation potential over long 
crediting periods
Integrate in the rules, modalities 
and procedures for Article 6.4 
mechanism.
Other possibilities would be  
decisions by the supervisory 
body or “club”.
Part of Article 6.4  
negotiations. Possible. 





Addresses the incentive to adopt 
unambitious NDC targets.
Integrate in the rules, modalities 
and procedures for Article 6.4 
mechanism.
Other possibilities would be  
decisions by the supervisory 
body or “club”.




criteria for the 
Article 6.4 mecha-
nism (relating to 
NDC targets)
The different criteria address  
perverse incentives and/or  
contribute to ambition raising.
Integrate in the rules, modalities 
and procedures for Article 6.4 
mechanism.
Other possibilities would be de-
cisions by the supervisory body 
or “club”.
Part of Article 6.4  
negotiations. Possible  
if “soft”. Similar rule  
exists under CDM.
Requiring inclu-
sion of emissions 
targeted by Article 
6.4 activity into 
future NDC
Addresses the incentive to  
maintain a narrow scope in  
a NDC. Contributes to ambition 
raising.
Integrate in the rules, modalities 
and procedures for Article 6.4 
mechanism.
Other possibilities would be de-
cisions by the supervisory body 
or “club”.
Part of Article 6.4 negotia-
tions, but rather unlikely






Addresses the quality  
of mitigation outcomes  
as necessary prerequisite  
for ambition raising.
Integrate in the modalities, 
procedures, and guidelines for 
the transparency framework for 
action and support in the context 
of the accounting rules.
Integrate in the rules, modalities 
and procedures for Article 6.4 
mechanism.
Part of Article 6.4 negotia-
tions, but rather unlikely





Indirect impact through support 
for good planning processes  
in host countries
Integrate suggestions for long-
term low greenhouse gas emis-
sion development strategies and 
other planning activities.
Support for some host countries 
that need it.
Yes, requires internati-
onal (acquiring country) 
resources
Facilitate inves-
tments in new 
low-carbon tech-
nologies
Indirect impact through  
investments in low-carbon  
technologies
Support for some host countries 
that need it.
Yes, requires internati-
onal (acquiring country) 
resources
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4) Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism
Using lower 
compliance costs 
of Article 6.4 for 
ambition raising
Limited; Historically, experience 
was mixed.
Acquiring country’s own  
decision. Possible
Increasing ambiti-
on with long-term 
strategies
Limited; Strategy needs to 
demonstrate complementarity of 
transfer of mitigation out-comes 
and domestic action.
Integrate in the suggestions  
for the long-term low greenhouse 
gas emission development 
strategies
Other possibilities would be  
decisions by the supervisory 
body or “club”.
Possible
Risk reduction Relevant Acquiring country’s own  decision. Possible
“Insetting”:  







Countries wanting to import 
mitigation outcomes from abroad 
and use them for NDC attainment 
could decide to carry out additio-
nal domestic reductions that are 
linked to the mitigation outcomes 
acquired.
First option unlikely,  
but “club” option seems 
possible
4.2 Recommendations
Without adequate incentives, rules and procedures, the Article 6.4 mechanism may fail to achieve its goal  
of contributing to ambition raising and, on the contrary, may provide numerous perverse incentives for host 
countries not to increase their ambition levels, possibly leading to a race to the bottom.
In the current negotiations, a key issue of concern is that a host country engaging in Article 6 has no incentive 
to set ambitious targets, because this may directly reduce the amount of mitigation outcomes that go beyond  
the NDC target and that can be transferred internationally. Another key issue is that if the mechanism allows 
crediting of activities that are beyond the scope of the NDC without requiring the host country to account  
for exported mitigation outcomes from such activities, there is no incentive for the host country to expand  
the scope of the NDC, because it would reduce the potential to obtain external funding.
Based on earlier work (Schneider et al. 2017, Warneke et al. 2018, Howard 2018, Kreibich 2018) four lines of 
action are identified to mitigate perverse incentives and foster NDC target ambition raising in host and acquiring 
countries in the context of article 6.4:
a) Strengthening reporting, transparency and comparability
b) Reconciling the design of the Art. 6.4 mechanism with ambition raising of host countries
c) Supporting the host country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism
d) Fostering the acquiring country to raise ambition through the Article 6.4 mechanism
The first two lines of action may be implemented on different levels, depending on the level of international 
agreement with regard to the need to prevent perverse incentives from the use of the Article 6.4 mechanism.  
The following cascade may be considered:
▸	 CMA/ rulebook level (international governance setting required)
▸	 Supervisory Body for Article 6.4
▸	 “Club” of likeminded parties
▸	 Individual acquiring countries defining criteria for mitigation outcomes purchase
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In order for the Article 6.4 mechanism to actually contribute to ambition raising, it would be important to have 
clear rules on the rulebook level or on the level of the supervisory body. Ideally, Article 6.4 could only be used 
by countries that have ambitious NDCs and that cannot only demonstrate this ambition but also report trans-
parently about progress.
In December 2018 in Katowice, the rulebook has been adopted. However, Parties could not find an agreement 
on Article 6. This means that many issues on the first line of action (a) have been clarified. Nevertheless, the 
outcome needs further analysis and some issues remain unclear, including issues on e. g. reporting related to 
Article 6. The second line of action (b) will be further negotiated on the CMA level, but these negotiations may 
turn out to be challenging. The task of reconciling the use of Article 6.4 with the need for progress in NDC target 
levels and scope may be handed down to the Article 6.4 supervisory body who may put in place rules under 
Article 6 such as the limitation of crediting periods as well as the definition of criteria for the participation  
of host countries in Article 6.4 activities (b). 
In absence of the CMA or the Article 6.4 supervisory body providing rules to prevent the perverse incentives, 
“clubs” of like-minded (host and acquiring) countries can agree among themselves on additional rules regar-
ding information (a) and Article 6.4 (b) that govern all transactions between the countries (i. e. the acquiring 
country would only allow mitigation outcomes for compliance with their NDC target that fulfil additional 
criteria regarding (a) and (b)). 
Initially, individual acquiring countries may decide to define criteria for purchasing mitigation out-comes that 
follow the approaches listed in lines of action (a) and (b) and implement them together with interested host 
countries.
The support of host countries to raise ambition (c) is a role that many (potential) acquiring countries and 
multilateral institutions have historically carried out already in the Kyoto periods and will probably continue  
to do so under the Paris Agreement. The need for support is strengthened by the additional requirements  
for host countries in terms of planning their mitigation actions on a national level and demonstrate how  
to reconcile ambition raising in NDC target with the use of Article 6.4 over time.
Finally, fostering action to raise ambition on the side of the acquiring country (d) is key to achieve the targets  
of the Paris Agreement and will mainly be achieved by acquiring countries implementing it individually or as 
part of a “club”.
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